Recent Property Tax Cases
Recent Court Opinions
Updated : November 22, 2023
Jones v. King
2023 WL 5969378 (W.D. Tex., September 13, 2023)
Issues: Official immunity
This case involves a widespread feud between officials and their various relatives. Renteria, Busse, and King were members of the appraisal district’s board of directors. Busse and King claimed that Renteria did not really live in the county and that he was not eligible to serve on the board. Busse and King demanded that Renteria resign. They voted for a board resolution demanding his resignation. They also voted in favor of having the appraisal district sue him. Renteria sued them in federal court alleging that had violated his First Amendment rights. The court gave a magistrate judge the job of determining whether Busse and King were immune from Renteria’s claims.
In a lengthy opinion, the magistrate judge concluded that the two were immune. The judge explained that members of a governmental body like the board of directors have the right to express their opinions and take action on the eligibility of other members of the body. Thay can vote to authorize a lawsuit on behalf of the governmental organization. It didn’t matter that they might have acted out of a personal grudge against Renteria. In the judge’s words, “King and Busse, acting in their official capacities as members of the Appraisal Board, are shielded from liability pertaining to votes and resolutions that they participated in and were adverse to [Renteria], no matter how malicious their motives.” Renteria failed to show a First Amendment violation and claims should be dismissed.
The Duncan House Charitable Corporation v. Harris County Appraisal District
2023 WL 5655872 (Tex. September 1, 2023)
Issues: Exemptions
Duncan House applied for a charitable exemption in 2017, and the appraisal district denied the application. Following an unsuccessful protest to the ARB, Duncan House sued the district. The suit was still pending in the spring of 2018. Duncan House did not file an exemption application, so the district never considered whether to grant an exemption for 2018. Duncan House nevertheless filed a protest in 2018. When the ARB denied the protest, Duncan House added a 2018 exemption claim to its pending lawsuit. The trial court dismissed the 2018 claim because Duncan House had not applied for the exemption in 2018. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Duncan House then asked the Texas Supreme Court to consider the case, and the Supreme Court agreed.
The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts. The high Court relied on §11.43 of the Tax Code which says that a charitable exemption (under §11.18 of the Tax Code), once allowed in one year does not require new applications in subsequent years unless the appraisal district instructs the property owner to file a new application. A final determination of Duncan House’s 2017 exemption claim had not yet been made, so it was impossible to say whether Duncan House had to file an application for 2018. Without a final determination of the 2017 exemption claim, the lower courts should not have dismissed the 2018 claim. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.
Editor’s Comment: The Supreme Court’s reasoning puts a property owner in the position of Schrodinger’s cat. The owner might be required to file an exemption application, or he/she might not, and that question won’t be determined until something happens in the future. The law doesn’t work like that. The correct answer is simple. In 2018, the exemption claimed by Duncan House had never been allowed. Thus, looking at the spring of 2018, Duncan House was required to file a new application. Its failure to do so should result in the denial of the 2018 exemption.
Cantu v. Bexar County Appraisal District
2023 WL 5239688 (Tex. App. – San Antonio, August 16, 2023, no pet. hist.) (not reported)
Issues: Immunity from suit
Following an unsuccessful protest, Cantu sued the appraisal district to contest the appraised value of his property. He also named the chief appraised as a defendant and threw in a hatful of vague claims to the effect that the chief appraiser was maliciously violating his rights. The appraisal district filed a plea to the jurisdiction asking that the chief appraiser be dismissed from the case altogether and that all non-tax claims against the district be dismissed. The district argued that the chief appraiser was immune from the suit. The trial court sustained the district’s plea. Cantu filed an interlocutory appeal complaining that the chief appraiser should not have been dismissed.
The court of appeals dismissed the appeal. The higher court explained that ordinarily a party can appeal only a final judgment that disposes of all claims and all parties. Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code creates an exception to the general rule. It allows an interlocutory appeal of a trial court’s order that “denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on as assertion of immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state.” In this case, however, the trial court had not denied the motion to dismiss the chief appraiser; it had granted that motion. There was no basis for an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal and sent the case back to the trial court.
Harris County Appraisal District v. Crossview Partners, Ltd.
2023 WL 3873356 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.], June 8, 2023, no pet. hist.) (not reported)
Issues: Interlocutory appeal
The ARB issued an order determining Crossview’s protest. Crossview let the deadline for filing a lawsuit pass. Then it asked the ARB to reissue the order so as to give Crossview another opportunity to file a suit. The ARB refused. Crossview sued the appraisal district and the ARB complaining about the appraisal of its property and about the ARB’s refusal to reissue the order. The ARB and the district filed pleas to the jurisdiction which were granted by the trial court. Crossview then filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court granted Crossview’s motion, vacated its earlier orders dismissing the case, and remanded the matter to the ARB. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal.
The court of appeals ruled that the interlocutory appeal was not allowed under the circumstances presented. Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows a governmental unit to file an interlocutory appeal granting or denying the unit’s plea to the jurisdiction. The higher court reasoned that the trial court’s order was not an order granting or denying the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction. It was an order granting a motion for new trial. The court said that such an order can be challenged by a writ of mandamus but not by an interlocutory appeal. So, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal, leaving the trial court’s order standing for the time being.
Editor’s Comment: This opinion really emphasizes form over substance. The district and the ARB asked the trial court to dismiss the case, and the trial court ultimately refused. The trial court’s order may have been called an order granting a new trial, but in substance it was a denial of the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction. Now the parties and the courts will have to waste more time and energy on a case that should clearly be dismissed.
J-W Power Co. v. Frio County Appraisal District
2023 WL 3081772 (Tex. App. – San Antonio, April 26, 2023, no pet. hist.) (to be published)
Issues: Correcting appraisal rolls
This is yet another in a series of cases involving pipeline compressors. The facts are identical to those in J-W Power Co. v. Jack County Appraisal District and J-W Power Co. v. Wise County Appraisal District decided earlier this year and summarized below. The San Antonio Court of Appeals agreed with the Fort Worth Court of Appeals and ruled that J-W Power could not use a motion under §25.25(c) to raise a claim that it had already raised in a protest, a claim that had already been decided finally by the ARB.
Hunt Woodbine Realty Corp. v. Dallas Central Appraisal District
2023 WL 2596074 (Tex. App. – Dallas, March 22, 2023, no pet.) (not reported)
Issues: Correcting appraisal rolls
Hunt Woodbine owned a parking lot adjacent to a hotel. The hotel was owned by a related business. The appraisal district appraised each property separately for five years. Then Hunt Woodbine filed a motion to correct the past years’ appraisal rolls under §25.25(c) of the Tax Code. Hunt Woodbine claimed that its parking lot had been the subject of multiple appraisals. After losing before the ARB, Hunt Woodbine sued the appraisal district. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. Hunt Woodbine offered expert testimony to the effect that the two properties were an economic unit and that the district’s income-approach appraisal of the hotel had included the value of the parking lot. Thus, the district had allegedly included the value of the parking lot twice, once as part of the hotel value and once in a separate account. The district did not submit any evidence. The trial court granted the district’s motion and denied Hunt Woodbine’s motion. Hunt Woodbine appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and ruled that neither side was entitled to a summary judgment. The court said that multiple appraisals can exist even though the appraisal roll, on its face, does not show the same property listed twice. When considering a claim of multiple appraisals, a court can look behind the appraisal roll itself. The expert testimony was enough to raise a question of fact about whether multiple appraisals had occurred, but it was not sufficient to prove the expert’s theory conclusively. It was not sufficient to establish that the parking lot account should simply be deleted. The court of appeals sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.
A comment in the court of appeals’ opinion raises the question of whether the owner of one property account can even complain about multiple appraisals if the allegedly redundant account is listed in another owner’s name. But the court did not answer that question.
J-W Power Co. v. Wise County Appraisal District
2023 WL 2325507 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth, March 2, 2023, no pet. hist.) (not reported)
Issues: Correcting appraisal rolls
This is another in a series of cases involving pipeline compressors. The facts are identical to those in J-W Power Co. v. Jack County Appraisal District decided earlier this year and summarized below. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals once again ruled that J-W Power could not use a motion under §25.25(c) to raise a claim that it had already raised in a protest, a claim that had already been decided finally by the ARB. The court’s opinion in this case relies heavily on its earlier opinion in the Jack County case.
J-W Power Co. v. Jack County Appraisal District
2023 WL 415517 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth, January 26, 2023, no pet. hist.) (not reported)
Issues: Correcting appraisal rolls
This is a lingering remnant of the compressor cases. The Tax Code directs appraisal districts to appraise leased heavy equipment (including pipeline compressors) at values far below actual market value. When that provision was enacted, appraisal districts resisted, arguing that the Texas Constitution required them to appraise property at market value. The dispute resulted in hundreds of lawsuits. In 2018, the Texas Supreme Court shocked everyone by ruling that the Constitution did not require appraisals based on market value. The Court upheld the Tax Code’s provision (§§23.1241 and 23.1242). The Court further interpreted the Code to make compressors taxable at the owner’s location, not where the compressors were actually located. Some property owners, including J-W Power began trying to claim the benefit retroactively for past years.
J-W Power filed protests concerning its compressors located in Jack County for several years prior to 2018. The ARB ruled against it, but J-W Power did not appeal. Then after the Supreme Court’s ruling, J-W Power tried to contest the 2013-2016 appraisals retroactively by filing motions with the ARB under §25.25(c). It claimed that its compressors were subjected to multiple appraisals and that they had not existed in Jack County. The ARB denied the motions, and J-W Power sued the district. The district asserted the defense of res judicata; it argued that the question of whether the property should be appraised as heavy-equipment inventory had already been finally decided by the ARB in the earlier protests and could not be raised again. The trial court entered summary judgment for the district, and J-W Power appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment for the district. J-W Power’s motion under §25.25(c) was the same claim asserted in the earlier protests. J-W Power cited §25.25(l), which states that a property owner may file a §25.25(c) motion even if the owner previously filed a protest relating to the value of the property. The court explained that the protests had not been protests about market value. They had specifically raised J-W- Power’s claim about heavy-equipment inventory. Section 25.25(l) did not allow J-W Power to raise the same claim again in a motion. When the ARB determined the protests, J-W Power had a ripe claim that it should have appealed.
The court of appeals further explained that it did not matter that the ARB had denied the §25.25(c) motion instead if dismissing the claim. The ARB’s order was not inconsistent with a determination that the motion was precluded by the earlier protests.